Maryland Montgomery County Reckless Driving Engaging Speed Conviction Lawyers Attorneys

Jaime Mauricio PINETA v. STATE of Maryland

COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS OF MARYLAND

December 30, 1993, Decided

December 30, 1993, Filed

On October 3, 1992, appellant was driving a blue Camaro IROC northbound on Georgia Avenue near the intersection of Randolph Road in Wheaton, Maryland, when he encountered an acquaintance, Jaime Chicas, driving a white Mustang.

Appellant and Chicas stopped their automobiles and conversed briefly. According to various State witnesses, the two vehicles then "revved" their engines and engaged in a "drag race" on Georgia Avenue, at estimated speeds of at least sixty to seventy miles per hour. The relevant stretch of Georgia Avenue is a three-lane road in each direction, with a speed limit that varies from thirty-five to forty-five miles per hour. As the two automobiles proceeded northbound, appellant was in the left lane and Chicas was in the center lane. Near the intersection of Georgia Avenue and Urbana Road, at a break in the median strip, a blue Toyota Corolla attempted to make a left turn from southbound Georgia Avenue into the driveway of a Kentucky Fried Chicken restaurant. As the Corolla crossed the northbound lanes, it passed in front of the Camaro successfully, but was struck by the Mustang. Both occupants of the Corolla, Neville Young and Dorette Morrison, were thrown from their vehicle and killed. Defendant was convicted of two counts of manslaughter by automobile, reckless driving, engaging in a speed contest, and speeding. The trial court for Montgomery County sentenced defendant to two concurrent eighteen-month terms of imprisonment on manslaughter convictions, with all but six months suspended, and imposed fines on each of the remaining convictions.

Defendant appealed.

Issues:

Whether the trial court erred in failing to resolve the convictions and sentences upon the lesser offenses under the doctrine of merger?

Whether the trial court erred in excluding relevant evidence?

Was the evidence sufficient to sustain a conviction of automobile manslaughter?

1) Whether the trial court erred in failing to resolve the convictions and sentences upon the lesser offenses under the doctrine of merger

Appellant was convicted of speeding and engaging in a speed contest, these two offenses do not merge, because one may engage in a race under section 21-1116(a) without necessarily exceeding the speed limit and one may exceed the speed limit under section 21-801.1 without engaging in a race. Thus, because each offense requires proof of a fact not required by the other, they do not merge under the required evidence test. Additionally, these two offenses do not merge under the rule of lenity. Under this rule, if the legislature did not intend to provide separate punishments for two statutory offenses, then the offenses merge. The relevant inquiry is whether the two offenses are "of necessity closely intertwined" or whether one offense is "necessarily the overt act" of the other. We hold that the two offenses presented here are not of necessity so closely related to give us reason "to assume that the legislative body contemplated the possibility of multiple punishments. Thus, merger for these offenses under the rule of lenity is not appropriate. Under the specific circumstances presented here, the jury must have based appellant's conviction for reckless driving solely on the evidence that supported his conviction for engaging in a speed contest. Thus, in this case, the speed contest charge became, in effect, a lesser-included offense of reckless driving. These offenses are, therefore, the same for purposes of our required evidence analysis. This Court concludes that the appellant's sentence for engaging in a speed contest must be vacated under the required evidence test.

Further, the reckless driving is not ordinarily sufficient evidence of gross negligence, unless it is of such "extraordinary or outrageous character" as to evince the required disregard for human life, rather than disregard for the safety of property. We hold that, under the required evidence test, the State must prove the lesser offense of reckless driving, in order to prove the greater offense of manslaughter by automobile. Although the precise issue of merger presented here has not previously been addressed by a Maryland appellate court, the Court of Appeals has held that negligent driving is a lesser-included offense of automobile manslaughter. There is no analytical difference between negligent driving and reckless driving for purposes of determining whether these offenses should merge into the offense of manslaughter by automobile.

This Court concludes that appellant's sentence on the reckless driving offense must be vacated under the required evidence test.

2) Whether the trial court erred in excluding relevant evidence?

The Court finds that there was no showing that the testimony regarding the codes used by the police officer in the accident report would render it more probable that the driver of the Toyota caused the accident. It is in the discretion of the trial court, in the first instance, to determine as a matter of law whether the ultimate fact to be proved is too remote from its evidentiary predicate. This Court concludes that the trial court properly excluded this evidence. Additionally, this court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding evidence of a subsequent accident that had occurred at the same intersection. Appellant made no showing that the subsequent accident had occurred under the same conditions that existed in the accident in this case. Thus, the court properly excluded this testimony as irrelevant.

3) Was the evidence sufficient to sustain a conviction of automobile manslaughter

The Court held that by engaging in the illegal speed contest, appellant aided and abetted the criminal conduct of Chicas and appellant's actions were the proximate cause of the victims' deaths. Thus, the evidence was sufficient to sustain appellant's convictions for manslaughter by automobile

Disclaimer:

These summaries are provided by the SRIS Law Group. They represent the firm's unofficial views of the Justices' opinions. The original opinions should be consulted for their authoritative content

Maryland Montgomery County Reckless Driving Engaging Speed Conviction Lawyers Attorneys

By: Atchuthan Sriskandarajah

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